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Preface 
George Strausser Messersmith was the most insightful Pmerican 
diplomat about German . affairs . in the early Nazi period. He served as 
Consul-General in Berlin from 1930 until May 1934 when he became 
Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna. He eventually was appointed 
Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Cuba and Mexicon 
Messersmith was born in Fleetwood, Pennsylvania in 1885 and began 
his career as a schoolteacher and administrator in the Delaware School 
System. Since schoolteacher's salaries were not substantial enough to 
• 
support his family, Messersmith took the advice of J. Basset Moore, the 
Counselor for t.1.e State Department, and went into the Foreign Service. 
After serving in consulates in Canada, South America and Belgium, he 
secured the post in Berlin. 
On a day to day basis , .Messersmith was considered to be the State 
Department's most reliable and informed observer. He was able to 
establish contacts with a number of high ranking Nazi officials and he 
used these contacts to substantiate his reports. Messersmith commented 
on almost every aspect of German life and these comments were read by 
most American policymakers, including Roosevelt. His reports were 
considered particularly valuable by two State Department officials, 
William Phillips and J. Pierrepont !"bffat, who both \vorked in the 
Western European Division. 
Some of Messersmith's analysis is skewed and, sometimes , incorrect . 
There were two faults with his reports of the German situation. Until 
i 
1937, Messersmith did not recognize the economic strength of Germany. 
Up to that point, he felt the German economy would fail and bring the 
Hitler Government down. Instead the Government became stronger due to 
economic successes. Messersmi th' s other area of failure was as a 
policy-maker. 
In this essay I shall examine Messersmith ' s reports of the Nazi 
situation paying particular attention to these two problems as well as 
his analysis of the Night of Long Knives on June 30, 1934. As one of 
the earliest skeptics of Hitler and of the Nazi regime, Messersmith was 
largely responsible for shaping American policy towards Germany during 
the first two years of Nazi rule. As a reporter of German affairs , he 
was the most insightful observer in the Foreign Service. 
ii 
General Analysis 
American Foreign Policy in the 1920 ' s and 1930' s was isolationist in 
attitude. For the most part, the United States viewed political events 
in Europe during this period with indifference. With the· exception of 
their sponsership of the agreement that legally banned war, the 
Kellog-Briand Pact, and in financial issues, the United States played a 
very minor role in European affairs during this period. 
The history of formal U.S.-German relations between the two World 
Wars was equally uneventful. Most of the corrnnercial contacts between 
the two countries during this period were handled in the United States 
by private investors. Relations were slow to develop. Because the 
Uni ted States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the t~vo 
governments were not officially at peace until August 1921. With the 
election. of President Harding in 1920, t.1-}e United States follo~ved a 
policy summed up by his campaign slogan, "a return to normalcy. II This 
policy meant that the United States would stay away from European 
politics, and avoid, to use a phrase of George Washington ' s, lIentangling 
alliances." Americans believed that this "America first" policy would 
keep the United States out of another European dispute like World War 
One. Not until the Dawes Plan in 1924 were there any substantial 
relations . With the Dawes Plan and German economic recovery, American 
loans began to flood the German lVlarket, enabling the German government 
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to pay its reparations promptly and in full.l After the Stock Market 
Crash and the ensuing Depression, both countries directed most of their 
efforts toward economic recovery. At this point, relations between the 
two countries began to deteriorate. American banks called back their 
Dawes Plan loans aggravating the German situation. 
t.vhen George Messersmith began his job as Consul in Berlin in 1930, 
German-American relations had already begun declining. By the time that 
Franklin Roosevelt became President of the United States in March 1933, 
barely one monL~ after Adolf Hitler had become Chancellor in Germany, 
the Depression 'v>'as near its worst point in both countries. 'llie top 
priority of L~eRoosevelt Administration became economic recovery for 
the United States. In addition, Isolationism as a foreign policy 
• 
doctrine was receiving acceptance across the country. In short, there 
was little support for an overly active American Foreign Policy. 
During the next five years German-American relations would 
deteriorate further · until, in 1938, the United States recalled their 
Ambassador in protest of the German pogrom against the Jews during 
Kristalnacht when Jewish stores, homes and synagouges were burned and 
vandalized. Messersmith's role in this deterioration was significant. 
His reports . contributed to the formation of a malevolent U.S. policy 
towards Germany. .Messersmi th reali zed that there was Ii ttle the Uni ted 
States could do to contribute to European Collective Security. Yet, he 
still considered it important to see to it that the State Department was 
well informed of the events inside Germany. 
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Messersmith's reports of German events were recorded in his personal 
letters and official correspondences. These communications, left at the 
University of Delaware and at the National Archives, lend insight into 
the formation of his ideas regarding Hitler and the Nazis. However, 
because his writing is overly wordy, his letters are difficult to read 
and therefore hard to research. Also since his papers are extremely 
lengthy (thereby earning him the nickname II Forty-Page Geocge"2), they 
are that much harder to probe. On many occasions Messersmith was asked 
by different Department officials to condense his observations; but, he 
usually responded that to do so would prevent him from filing a complete 
report. In one particularly turgid passage, Messersmith filled his 
despatch with an overabundance of independent clauses: 
While it is generally recognized that the political 
relations between states, with which the diplomatic 
mission of our Government has to concern itself, have 
almost entirely an economlC, financial or social 
background, and that purely political relations in the 
old sense of the word no longer exist, experience has 
.. ·.3. 
Nevertheless, these stylistic problems should prevent neither the 
researcher nor the reader from understanding the valuable and 
informative analysis that Messersmith had of the Nazi situation during 
the first two years of Hitler's reign. 
One of the aspects of Naziism that became obvious to Messersmith 
early in 1933 was the fine line that could be drawn between the legal 
parliamentary Government and the rule of the Nazi Party. In a despatch 
dated April 10,1933, Messersmith. described in detail this dual 
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government that had existed since March 6, "and from the course of 
events there is much reason to believe that the extra-legal Government 
is the stronger and influences definitely in most instances the acts of 
the legal and constitutional Government."4 With this type of a system, 
members of the government could insure that the bureaucracy was run 
within legal constraints. But, as members of the National Socialist 
Party, these same officials could engage , in extra,-legal acts. "Tn8re 
is" ,Messersmith continued, "reason' to believe that the legal Government 
serves as a convenient alibi for the illegal acts and terror exercised 
by the Party organization."S There was another advantage to this setup. 
When diplomats such as Messersmith complained of Governmental violence, 
the Government shifted the responsibility to the Party. This way the 
bureaucrats could prevent people like Messersmith from creating 
problems. 
Acting on this observation of "sanctioned" violence , Messersmith 
worked to protect Americans and American property from German 
harassment. On many occasions he had reason to complain to the German 
Interior Ministry, and twice directly confronted , Interior Minister 
Wilhelm Frick. The most serious case of an American being harassed 
occurred in Saxony in 1933, when SA men attacked a Jew named Zuckerman 
for not returning their Nazi salute. Even though Americans were not 
required to give the salute, these men beat Zuckerman until he required 
hospitalization. Messersmith personally took responsibility for the 
Zuckerman case and complained to the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry 
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pressured Frick about the poor care the case was being given by the 
Chief of Police in Saxony. Although the assailants were never 
apprehended, Messersmith made sure that Frick personally reprimanded the 
Police Chief in Saxony. Additionally, the Consul had a statement issued 
to stop further SA attacks on A~ericans. For his work Messersmith 
received a commendation and personal congratulations from many State 
Department officials.6 
Messersmith filed many other complaints about the excessive violence 
of the ' Nazi Government both to Washington and Berlin. At the center of 
many of these complaints was Nazi anti-Semitism. In an article for 
Jewish Social Studies, an author on Jewish affairs, Shlomo Shafir 
examined Messersmith's role as an opponent of Nazi anti-Semitism and as 
a friend of the German Jews. The principal topic in Messersmith's early 
despatches from Berlin concern the Nazi treatment of Jews, and 
especially American Jews in Germany. In countless letters Messersmith 
related new German laws that were aimed specifically at removing Jews 
from their occupations. After the Nuremburg Party rally in September 
1933, Messersmith wrote William Phillips a confidential letter 
describing his impressions. Phillips considered these observations so 
important he recommended that Roosevelt read the letter. 
The extreme brutality with which the anti-Semitic 
movement has been carried through, will I believe never 
be appreciated by the outside world, and while physical 
attacks may have stopped almost entirely I can assure you 
that the measures against the Jews are being carried out 
daily in a more implacable and a more effective 
manner •••• lt is definitely the aim of the Government ••• 
to eliminate the Jews from German life.7 
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While not even Messersmith knew what would become of the Jews under 
Nazi control in tlle next 12 years, this statement was an eerie forecast 
of the Final Solution. Such observations that Messersmith made appeared 
at the same time that other State Department officials were choosing to 
deny the validity of such reports. For instance, Arthur Morse r s bc-ok, 
~'ihile Six Million . Died, documents the story of American ignorance and 
appeasement of German anti~Semitism. With a large anti-Nazi 
demonstration planned by the Jewish Community in New York City, 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull sent an urgent telegram to American 
diplomats in Germany asking for any kind of assurance that could be 
released to the press stating that the situation in Germany was not as 
bad as these potential demonstrators believed it to,be.S In the wake of 
this kind of pressure from Hull and other department officials, like 
Assistant Secretary of State, J. Pierrepont Moffat, Messersmith softened 
his reports of Nazi brutality. Privately, however, he remained 
vehenently critical of Nazi anti-Semitism. One of the leaders of the 
Philiadelphia Jewish Community, Jacob Billikopf; quoted MessersInith as 
saying, "'There is no greater crime in history than that which the 
German Government is conunitting against the Jews. ' "9 
Interestingly, however, Messersmithrs solution to the problem of 
Nazi anti-Semitism was not the alteration of United States 
laws to allow more Jews the opportunity to leave Germany. 
imnigration 
Messersmith 
offered explicit advice about what should not be done. "I believe that 
it would be a great mistake from every point of view to endeavor to make 
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any change in our immigration laws . We are carrying out our visa 
practice in Germany with the greatest sympathy ••• "10 
How could Messersmith in September of 1933 have exhorted the 
barbarity of Nazi anti-Semitism and two months later have suggested that 
nothing be done with United States immigration laws? There appears to 
be a direct contradiction in his statements. If the Je\vs were unwanted 
in the United States, how can Messersmith condemn Hitler's 
anti-Semitism? Perhaps, one of the potential dangers Messersmith 
anticipated by allowing more German Jews to emmigrate to the United 
States, was the assimilation problem. The United States was already 
experiencing the worst unemployment in its history and further additions 
to the workforce would only have compounded the problem. Shafir cites 
• another reason for Messersmith's view: that many of these potential 
refugees were affiliated with Socialist and Communist movements. To 
allow these people into the United States, especially the intellectuals 
of the New School, a group it/ho became loosely affiliated with Columbia 
University and the University, in Exile, could have had politically 
undesirable consequences. Shafir defines this fear of Messersmith's as 
a basic "je\vophobia."11 To write off Messersmith's analysis as 
"jewophobia" does not seem sufficient. Messersmith was someone who sa\v 
the coming (or potential coming) of the harsh anti-Semitic legislation 
and did not advocate a change in policy to mitigate the problem. One 
explanation of why Messersmith did not see a change as being necessary 
was because he did not expect the Nazi Government to stay in power if 
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they tried to enforce too strongly these policies. Shafir concludes in 
his article that if someone as sympathetic to the German-Jewish problem 
as Messersmith was not willing to push for an easing of immigration 
laws, such a policy would probably not have found favor anywhere else in 
the State Department. 
The person responsible for much of the Nazi anti-Jewish legislation 
was also the person that Messersmith considered the key to Nazi success, 
the Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels. Messersmith was one of the 
few people in the State Department who was aware of the importance the 
Nazis placed on propaganda and of its possible effect both in Germany 
and internationally. Very early he warned of the potential danger that 
Goebbels and his Ministry might be. The State Department meanwhile was 
very nonchalant about the possible effect propaganda might have. Hitler 
appointed Goebbels to head the newly formed Ministry for Propaganda and 
Public Intelligence. With the formation of his new Ministry, Goebbels 
outlined its aiws and objectives: 
it must be our task not only to inform the press, but we 
have even a greater task, that of instructing the press 
so that it will make clear to the people what the 
Government is doing and why it is doing what it is 
(emphasis added).12 
For the Government to sanction a Propaganda Ministry was unprecedented 
in Germany and in the world. Mass propaganda was a relatively recent 
phenomenon and many people were unaware of its potential both for the 
dissemination of information and for danger. The United States 
Government and the State Department in particular were very confused 
8 
about the potentials of propaganda. The recent developnent of shortwave 
radios made broadcasts to a large number of people very easy. Germany 
was one of the first countries to successfully use shortwave broadcasts 
for governmental purposes. Hitler or Goebbels could make a speech in 
Munich and have it be heard throughout the country. 
The State Department, on the whole, had very nonchalant attitudes 
towards propaganda during t..l)is period. Already by May 12, Messersmith 
wrote, "press censorship may be considered as absolute. "13 i"1essersmith 
was one of the only Americans who recognized the potential that German 
propaganda, especially under Goebbel's leadership, could have. 
Messersmith considered Goebbels to be the most dangerous Nazi of all. 
On November 24, 1933, Messersmith wrote a character sketch of Goebbels 
which summed up most of Messersmith's impressions of Goebbels and his 
Ministry. In this sketch of Goebbels, Messersmi th. called him, 
the most energetic and indefatigable and hardest working 
man of the National-Socialist leaders. He is undoubtedly 
the most intelligent and clever man in the entire 
party.... He is the single most useful and effective 
member of L~e party.14 
No one in the Nazi Party was more resp~cted and feared by 
Messersmith than Goebbels. Other than Hitler, his effect on the course 
of events from 1933-34 in Germany was greater than any other Nazi. 
Messersmith, on many occassions, wrote that without Goebbels, Hitler 
would not have been able to maintain his dictatorship of Germany. This 
point could have been true. 
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Messersmith frequently mentioned his opinion concerning Hitler and 
his dictatorial power. Messersmi th' s attitudes during t.1-J.is period 
changed from a skeptical acceptance of the regime to a call for Hitler ' s 
complete removal from office. 
Early in 1933 Messersmith knew little more about the future of 
Germany than any other observer. It did not take him long, however, 
before he realized what Hitler's plans were for Germany and what they 
would entail for the rest of the world. On February 27, 1933, the 
Reichstag building was set on fire. The identity of the arsonists is 
still unk~own. A Dutch Communist, van der Lubbe, was arrested and 
confessed, but his guilt is still questioned. Hitler used the event to 
move against the Communists and in a series of events, culminating in a 
law of May 26, dissolved the Comnunist Party. Almost imm~iately 
Messersmith saw in the elimination of the Communist Party a precedent 
for further action. At the same time as he was sending despatches 
describing Nazi action against the Communists, the first Secretary of 
the American Embassy, Alfred Kliefoth, was explaining why such action 
would not take place. On February 20, 1933, Kliefoth quoted Frick in a 
despatch as saying that the Nazis, "would not supress the Communist 
Party, but would seek to overcome the Communist menace in Germany by 
convincing its followers of the error of their ways."lS Klie£oth 
continued by explaining that the reason the Nazis could not, 
"exterminate the corrrnunists by brutal force, [was because] a serious 
attempt in this direction may throw Russia into the open arms of 
10 
France. "16 Messersmith, 
disillusioned by Hitler's 
differently than Kliefoth. 
however, by February 1933 was already 
Germany and perceived the situation very 
Still, Messersmith's disillusionment did not 
stop him from making contacts in the Government because, after reaching 
the conclusion that the Nazi leaders were comparable to clinical 
psychopaths17, he' believed that informal contact with govern.'1lent 
officials was the only way to find anything out and to get anything 
done. By the time he left Berlin in May 1934, he had made contacts with 
many Nazis and other high placed Government officials. Messersmith felt 
that non-official meetings with leaders was the best way he could get 
information about the Nazis. 
The information that Messersmith accumulated through his informal 
interactions with these officials led him to conclude that the situation 
in Germany had grown "very serious" and that the "Department must_ be 
very careful in its dealings with Germany as long as the present 
Government is in power ••• "18 This letter to Phillips was very prophetic. 
In the middle of th.e letter, Messersmith wrote til.at Hi tIer was becoming 
disturbed because the masses in ~~e Party were trying to carry out what 
was called th.e "Second Revolution." This involved implementing some of 
the socialist aspects of National Socialism that Hitler resisted. 
Messersmith mentioned that Hitler intended to purge the Party after his 
power was consolidated. Messersmith would comnent on this issue many 
more times, always asking the question, will the leaders be able to 
"impose their moderate will on the masses?"19 When Hitler purged Ernst 
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Roehm and other radicals from the Party, this question was not lost on 
Messersmith. I shall consider the Night of Long Knives and 
Messersmith's observations of the event in chapter 3. 
Hitler's war preparations were also anticipated by Messersmith. In 
the same letter to Phillips, Messersmith made some insightful points 
concerning Nazi plans for peace and for T,var in the present. and in the 
future: 
while the Germany of today wants peace, it is by no means 
a peaceful country or one looking forward to a long 
period of peace. The present German Government and its 
adherents desire peace ardently for the present because 
they need peace to carry through the changes in Germany 
which they want to bring about. What they want to do, 
however, definitely is to make Germany the most capable 
instrument of war that there has ever existed.20 
Considering that this statement was made after only five months of 
Hitler's reign, Messersmith was not far from setting the scenario for 
the future of German poli tics for the next ten years. This was 
precisely the situation that Germany was in. Hitler needed peace for 
the early years so that he could build a German war machine without 
distractions. This was one of 1-1essersmith's most insightful points. He 
concluded his letter very pessimistically, claiming that the German 
Government was carrying itself and Europe to certain doom. He warned 
Phillips that great care had to be taken when dealing with Germany due 
to these plans for the future.2l 
In October 1933, after Hitler had withdrawn Germany from the League 
of Nations and from the Disarmament Conference , Messersmith again wrote 
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Phillips with his observations. In his comments concerning Hitler ' s 
announcement of the withdrawl, Messersmith questioned the sincerity of 
Hitler's regime. "I believe, that when Hitler says anything he for the 
moment convinces himself that it is true. He is ••• a fanatic."22 If 
Messersmith had ever trusted Hitler ' s Government, by October this trust 
had disappeared. At the end of this letter Messersmith compared t..l}e 
state of the Gennan Government to a madhouse, 
There are so many pathological cases involved that it 
would be impossible to tell from day to day what will 
happen any more than the keeper of a madhouse is able to 
tell what his inmates will do in the next hour or during 
the next day.23 
Even by October 1933, Messersmith had become frustrated enough to make 
this comparison. He was beginning to understand that this was not a 
traditional government and would not act in a traditional manner. Given 
that the situation at that time was so uncertain Messersmith gave his 
readers in Washington advice concerning how to deal with Germany. The 
situation was, "very insecure and [we] shall have to . judge Gennany by 
her deeds rather than by the declarations of her leaders."24 
Nine days later Messersmith concluded that the time had come for the 
United States to be very firm with Hitler's Government. Since none of 
their leaders could be trusted, any relations, other than those 
"essential for ordinary intercourse", should be stopped. Any gestures 
that Germany might attempt should be rebuffed. "I think we will be 
doing Germany as well as ourselves and the whole world a service."25 
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Shortly after sending this letter, another event occured in Germany 
heightened Messersmith' s cynacism. On November 12, 1933 the Nazi 
Government held a plebiscite to measure the support of the Nazi policies 
to that date. The election was was intended to discover how the German 
people felt about the German Government's withdrawl earlier that year 
from both the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and from the League of 
Nations. This pretense did not confuse Messersmith. A week before the 
vote was taken he wrote that the elections, "are going to be a hoax. 
Nothing can be learned from the results despite the fact that Hitler 
will claim a major victory... The only real victory will be the 
masterminding effort of Goebbels ' Propaganda Ministry for masterminding 
this basic election into a Nazi triumph."26 Part of the reason why the 
propaganda effort was so successful was because Goebbels and Hitler had 
the elections held the day after the fifteen year anniversary of the 
signing of the Armistice that ended WOrld War One -- the day that led to 
Germany being bound by the "shakles of Versailles. II Now the people of 
Germany had the chance to thrm'l off these shackles and regain thei r 
rightful position in Europe. Hitler and Goebbels did not miss their 
chance to exploit this sentment everywhere. Messersmith's despatch 
continues, "All of the public, regardless of their politics (Nazi, 
anti-Nazi, Socialist), want to see Germany reestablished in a position 
in Europe of equality. "27 If for this reason alone, Messersmi th wrote to 
Phillips on November 23, the election must be viewed as a "huge 
spectacle." 
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The results of the election were staggering -- ninety-six percent 
turnout with ninety-five percent of the votes in favor of Hitler's 
policies. 28 These figures did not suprise Messersmith who had become 
cynical of the whole election before it even took place. In h.is letter 
to Phillips, he described both the overt and covert coecion that was 
used. "'Ihe Gennan people have learned during the past eight months what ' 
lack of conformity to party wishes and discipline involves. An election 
was to be held and the party mandate went out to vote 'yes'. This was 
sufficient in present day Germany."29 '!his election, more than any other 
specific event in 1933, was responsible for Messersmith's 
disillusionment of Nazi Germany. The coercion involved typified for 
Messersmith the ideas and practices of the Nazi regime. By the end of 
1933 the recovery that Messersmith was so confident of, at the beginning 
of the year, had disappeared, and there was not much hope in his mind 
that the future would be any better. 
In January 1934, MessersmiL~ went home to visit with family and 
friends. While he was at home, Roosevelt nominated him for the post of 
Minister to Uruguay. As a minister Messersmith would have had the 
chance to move out of the Consul Corps and into the Foreign Service 
branch of the State Department. Messersmith was quite pleased with the 
promotion except such a move would remove him from the focus of his 
concerns. Messersmith returned to Berlin in March to pack his bags. 
When he returned he discovered that the American Ambassador in Berlin~ 
William E. Dodd, had been pushing for Messersmith' s nomination for the 
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vacated ministerial post in Vienna. Roosevelt felt Messersmith would be 
the perfect man for such a position, and withdrew the nomination for the 
Montevideo post offering him the job in Vienna. Messersmith gladly 
accepted. Such a position was perfect for Messersmith. He had received 
the promotion to Minister which would make further advancement easier, 
and he was able to stay near ,the Nazi situation in a crucial listening 
post. 
One of the first things Messersmith noticed when he returned to 
Europe was that nothing had changed -- the deterioration had continued 
at a constant rate. Messersmith's job in Vienna gave him a different 
angle of vision to observe Germany with. He was no longer at the center 
of activity in Berlin. He felt that being in Vienna offered him, "[t]he 
opportunity for perhaps even greater objectivity and relatively more 
correct perspective. 1I 30 This different viewing position did not change 
his opinion of the regime. 
During his first year in Austria, Messersmith observed two crises 
one in Germany and one in Austria. Barely one month after his arrival 
in Vienna, Hitler purged the Nazi Party, killing Roehm, Gregor Strasser 
and others in the Night of Long Knives on June 30 (see Chapter 3). Less 
than one month after the purge, a band of Austrian Nazis broke into the 
Austrian Chancellery on J'uly 25, and shot and killed Englebert Dollfuss, 
the Austrian Chancellor. These two events (though Hi tIer was not 
totally responsible for either) combined to horrify Messersmith, and 
permanently embitter him towards the Hitler regime. This is obvious 
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through the tone of his letters and despatches he began to refer 
unfavorably of "the mentality of the TriLnnverate." 
T'nis bitterness grew throughout the s ummer. After Hindenburg' s 
death in August, i"1essersmi th \'irote one of his Joost pessimistic accounts 
of the German situation. He began by discounting the view many people 
still held that Hi tIer was becoming milder in his actions. "'I'his I 
consider to be one of the most dangerous factors of the European 
situation."31 Up to the outbreak of the War, Hitler was able to 
effectively exploit appeasement-minded leaders with promises of a milder 
course of action. Messersmith no longer wrote of linking German policy 
to economic benefits. Instead he called for a denial of those benefits 
to bring the Nazi Government down. Messersmith offered a warning that 
a , "change [of strategy] cannot be mistaken to be a change of policy."32 
Messersmith ~~en related the significance that Hindenburg ' s death on 
August 2 would have on the situation in Germany. An hour after the 
President's death an announcement was made that the offices of 
Chancellor and President would. be merged. · By assuming the office of 
President, Hitler als<? took over Hindenburg's job as Corrunander-in-Chief 
of the Army. By becoming Corrunander of the Reichswehr, Hitler was given 
a personal oath of allegiance by the officers and men of the Reichswehr, 
"I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuhrer of the German Reich 
and People, Adolf Hi tIer, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces , and 
will be ready, as a brave soldier, to stake my life at any time for this 
oath. "33 Messersmith pointed out the significance of this oath: 
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As long as Hindenburg was ali ve the Army's oath of 
allegiance was directly to him and in taking action 
against the National Socialist Party the army was in no 
sense violating its oath. Now they have been placed in 
the postion of swearing allegiance to Hitler and this in 
lny opinion greatly complicates the situation. It 
prevents the function of action of the army, for now 
action is equivilent to a breach of their oath.34 
Messersmith sa~ this same situation while he was serving in Argentina. 
The army saw itself as L~e only means to overthrow the corrupt 
Government of Irygoyen; but, because of their oath of allegiance, they 
were unable to act. He was concerned because he realized that the 
circumstances in Argentina were similar to those that he was observing 
in Germany. Even though the Reichswehr might have wanted to overthrow 
Hitler's Government, they would not. Their oath of allegiance was 
uncompromisable. The Army did not want to compromise their oath because 
Hi tIer, in thei r opinion, was following a favorable course. During the 
war, as Hitler began to assume a dictatorial role over military affairs, 
many officers refrained from opposing him because of this oath. In 
1934, however, they were in support of the Hitler Government. 
Later in this letter after warning Phillips about the gravity of the 
situation, Messersmith complimented the United States' policy towards 
Germany, "I think our [decisions] have been very wise so far."35 This 
approval was understandable. Messersmith ' s letters were a significant 
factor in framing this policy. His recommendation of malevolent 
neutrality toward the Hitler Government was heeded by the State 
Department. On a day-to-day basis Messersmith was considered by the 
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Department to be the most reliable reporter of German affairs. The 
United States and Germany had little formal interaction, and this was 
exactly the course Messersmith advocated. 
Things had not improved for Messersmith in the next three weeks, and 
on September 7, he made his most decisive statement to that date: "I 
••• believe that the only hope for Europe, and in a way for u~ all, lies 
in the elimination of the present German .Governrnent. 1I36 One .of the 
problems eliminating the Hi tIer Government would . be finding a 
replacement. ·ro many people this meant Cormnunism. Hi tIer and Goebbels 
used this fear among Europeans and Americans, portraying Germany as the 
bulwark against Cormnunism and Bolshevism. Like the election propaganda 
ploy, Messersmith was not misled by this illustration. At the same time 
as he was making these statements, Hitler was trying to obtain 
international credits. "'!'he ••• threat is that the world must choose 
between this Government and the only alternative which would be 
Cormnunism. To those who know the German situation ' [this threat] will 
mean li ttle. "37 Messer:smi th, on the other hand, argued that the next 
German Government would probably be Conservative, not Cormnunist. 
Nevertheless, Messersmith believed that the Nazis had done more harm in 
Germany and Europe in two years than the Bolsheviks had done in Russia 
in fifteen. 
1934 ended slightly more optimistic for Messersmith. than it had 
started. Messersmith was encouraged by French, British and Italian 
cooperation against Germany and further denials by the United States for 
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credits. The situation inside Germany had grown worse. Hitler was able 
to consolidate his power and the populous had grown even more 
submissive. A change in location did not change Messersmith's adament 
stand against Hitler and the Nazis. He would continue to send reports 
calling for Hitler's expulsion. I would now like to examine 
Messersmith's analysis of the German economy and then consider his 
observations dealing with the Night of Long ~1ives. 
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Economic Analysis 
The central issue in Germany during this period was the same as that 
confronting the United States: economic depression. Germany was 
probably the country that was most affected by the Great Depression. In 
,January 1933, President Paul· von Hindenburg appointed Hi tIer, Chancellor 
with the hope that Hitler could achieve some stability. One of the most 
important issues in M.essersmith ·s mind was how successful Hitler and the 
Nazis would be in solving this depression. As Consul-General, 
i~lessersmi th sent a report composed by all nine American consulates in 
Germany to Washington concerning the economic situation in their 
respective areas shortly after Hitler became Chancellor. Interestingly, 
all nine consulates reported that they considered th.at the nadir of the 
depression in Germany had been reached and the recovery prospects for 
the future appeared to be bright. The report went on to say that the 
improvement of the German economy was the result of activity which had 
begun in the last three months of 1932.38 I shall expand a discussion of 
Germany's economic recovery later. 
As a means of introduction, this report,which was one of the first 
th.at Messersmith sent regarding the new Hi tIer Government, was crucial 
to his evaluation of this Government and of its economic policies. In 
his additions to this report, Messersmith included comments about the 
new government and Germany's economic and political future. Obviously, 
after four days of the Hitler Chancellorship, Messersmith could predict 
very little of Germany's future. 
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It is impossible to estimate at this time what the effect 
of the Hitler - Hugenberg Government will have upon this 
improvement which has become evident in the last three 
months, but there is a wide feeling among consevative 
businessmen and financiers that it is extremely 
unfortunate that this change of Government with its 
possibilities of various types of political experiments 
should have come at this time as it may not only slow up, 
but stop the improvement which was fairly well started in 
the general internal economic situation.39 
Also' ih this report, l'1essersmith offered another commonly held 
opinion of the Nazis: regardless of how long the regime lasted, its 
failure might demonstrate that the Nazis and Hitler were just as 
incapable of solving Germany' s economic problems as any other radical 
regime would be. Messersmith articulted to the State Department his 
ideas of what might come in the next few weeks and months. "I believe 
that it is safe to venture that nothing will happen within Germany to 
seriously disturb this forward movement or to make the German internal 
situation a disturbing factor in the improvement in world economic 
conditions ••• "40 As cited in the last chapter, it did not take 
Messersmith long to change his opinion of Hitler and the Nazis. 
One of the reasons that Messersmith changed his opinion of the Nazis 
was because of their economic policy. This is an interesting fact, 
considering that h'1e Nazi economic policy put the Germans back to work 
and, by the time Messersmith left Europe in 1937, Germany had a labor 
shortage. It is obvious from the passages quoted earlier that 
Messersmith was not particularly happy with the Nazi Government from the 
start. In his opinion, Germany had begun the road to economic recovery 
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and the only thing the Nazis could do would be to disrupt this course. 
Throughout his tenure in Europe the economic failure of Germany was one 
of Messersmith's major areas of attack. Almost every time ~essersmith 
predicted a change of government, he assigned to that change an economic 
cause. Nonetheless, it is a frustrating issue to understand because 
throughout his commentary he rarely offered the specific economic factor 
which would incite these. changes of power. In March 1933, in a 
despatch, Messersmith wrote, "[Germany's economic] policy is so 
uncertain and so undeveloped and is headed in such radical directions 
••• "41 Messersmith never gave statistical evidence for these claims. He 
never explained what it was in German economic policy that was so 
uncertain, undeveloped and radical. Possibly the most concrete analysis 
Messersmith gave concerning Germany's economic situation was a year 
later wr!en he wrote to Phillips that the cost of living was still goipg 
up and personal income was going down. This analysis was incorrect. 
Messersmith's economic analysis was his most critical failure. Not 
until 1937, when he returned to the United States, did be acknowledge 
that Hitler had economically strengthened Germany. Equally significant, 
however, is the distrust and hatred of the Nazis that Messersmith 
developed because of this perceived economic failure. The issue here is 
not whether Messersmith's observations were correct but that from these 
observations came a great deal of distrust of Hi tIer and t.~.e Nazis. 
Messersmith saw an economic upturn at the end of 1932, just before 
Hitler became Chancellor. In 1933, while Hitler was Chancellor, 
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Messersmith believed he saw the economic recovery stop and reverse 
direction. What Messersmit..~ percieved to be economic problems was a 
source of his distrust of Hitler's Germany. In analyzing Messersmith, 
this is as important a point as what the economy was actually doing 
because so much of Messersmith's distrust emanated from his perception 
of economic failure under Nazi policy. 
I would like to assess Germa..'1Y's economic situation during the early 
Nazi years in order to determine to what extent Messersmith's analysis 
was indeed correct. The economic problem in Germany was a very 
sensitive issue. A German leader could not remain in office ~"i thout 
helping the German economy. l'1essersmi th pointed out this fact in his 
first despatch concerning the new Nazi Government.42 During the 1920's, 
Germany suffered from massive inflation and cost of living increases. 
Governments changed as often as the mark fluctuated. In the D~pression 
of 1929, Germany was the country in Europe most affected. Messersmith 
and the rest of the American consuls detected in the last three months 
of 1932 an improvement and stabilization in the German economy. There 
was a certain amount of truth in their analysis. On paper 1932 was the 
worst year of the depression, with unemployment figures over 30 percent. 
'!'he economic problems, however, seem to have reached a nadir in the 
middle of that year. With the Lausanne Conference in the Summer of 1932 
suspending reparations payments, German business improved. Production 
was increasingly active, with the index of industrial production going 
up 10 percent from August to November. This increased production led to 
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an increase in employment and consumption. The onset of Winter and 
seasonal stagnation slowed this improvement slightly, but Messersmith 
had reason to be generally encouraged by the economic recovery. The 
arrival of an uncertain regime would naturally lead to apprehension 
concerning the economic recovery of Germany. However, this economic 
recovery continued. Wages in -both Agriculture and Industry stabilized 
in 1933, well below 1929 figures, but the severe decline had been 
halted. The cost of living levelled off as well, and, most importantly, 
the unemployment figures declined sharply over the two years 1933-34 , 
from an over 30 percent figure in 1932 to one under 15 percent for 1934. 
These indicators directly contradict Messersmith ' s forecasts of economic 
doom for Hitlerian Germany.43 
MessersmiLh' s economic analysis is recognized as the faultiest area 
of his observations. Furthermore, his plans to deal with the Hitler 
government centered around this analysis. But, if this was 
Messersmith's biggest mistake, he was not alone in making it. Many 
other analysts, German and others, were also under the impression that 
Hitler's Germany was on the edge of an economic collapse. As late as 
September 1934, when Messersmith was in Vienna , he wrote the State 
Department a despatch claiming that the major crisis in the country was 
the economic one.44 Throughout his tenure in Berlin, Messersmith 
described many conversations with high-level German officials, both Nazi 
and non-Nazi, who anticipated potential economic problems in Germany. 
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One financial issue that Messersmith was correct about was the 
German need for credit in the form of loans and raw materials. A way to 
prevent the Nazi government from becoming too strong was to remain as 
aloof as possible to German requests for these credits. The policy of 
the State· Department during this period under the leadership of Wilbur 
J. Carr was to fight diplomatic battles economically. Messersnith saw 
t.l-}is credit battle as a way to keep Germany, and Hitler in particular, 
in check. In April of 1934 Messersmith wrote two letters concerning the 
German economy and his attitudes toward what should be done by the 
United States. On April 13, in a letter to Phillips, Messersmith 
painted a particularly gloomy picture of the German economy. He 
compared the situation to a wartime regimine rationing of raw 
materials, severe importation restrictions, stoppage of interest 
payments by the Government. Given the position that Germany was in at 
that time, Messersmith claimed that many patriotic Germans were 
beginning to see a ray of hope. 
They feel that the greatest hope L~atthey have is that 
the rest of the world will maintain its present attitude, 
refusing to prop up in any way the existing regime.45 
The next day Messersmith wrote to Moffat outlining his ideas for what 
United States policy should be towards giving Germany credits. For 
Messersmith, especially after July 1934 at which point he openly calls 
for a change of government, the job of the United States was to playa 
wait-and-see game with German requests for credits, "rather than jillnP 
right in because of the short-sighted greed of a few industrialists. We 
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are in the driver ' s seat and have nothing to lose and everything to gain 
by waiting."46 
In one letter Messersmith described a conversation he had with Dr. 
Franz Grueger, chief of the economic deparbnent of a large 
government-owned bank, who predicted serious economic problems for 
Hitler' s Genr.al1Y. 47 In this letter of May 17, 1934, Grueger placed the 
success of the regime on how able it was to reemploy the country and 
raise the standard of living. The only reason that Hitler had been able 
to reduce unemployment up to that point was through massive government 
subsidies that could not continue without importation of raw materials 
to keep production at such a high level. What neither Grueger nor 
Messersmith seemed to see was that Hitler ' s reemployment programs were 
directly related to his rearmament designs. He could easily put the 
country back to work in jobs that would .displace no one by creating an 
armaments industry. The only problem that Grueger addressed with this 
analysis was his claim that German stocks of raw Inaterials were almost 
exhausted and substitutes could .not be found in substantial .. amounts in 
Germany. '!he way the Government was maintaining this level of 
production was by placing the German economy on a war-time basis and 
isolating Germany until economic export concessions were granted by 
foreign countries. 
almost exhausted, 
Because present stocks of raw materials had been 
industry would be forced to ~ut back, leading almost 
certainly to massive unemployment under which the present regime could 
not survive. Why did such a scenario not materialize and bring down the 
Hitler Government? 
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The situation in Germany never reached this crisis point , because 
Hitler, with the encouragement of his chief economic adviser, Hjalmar 
Schacht, was able to sign bilateral trade agreements with countries that 
could supply Germany with the raw materials it needed. Iron ore was 
obtained from Sweden and oil from Rumania. Gustav Stolper' s book, The 
German Economy 1870 to - the Present, states that Germany was able to 
establish trade agreements with all the important- trading countries 
except Britain and the United States. Messersmith's policy of 
containing Germany by not trading with them was circumvented by German 
trade agreements with other countries. 
The problem of Messersmith's analysis, however, has not been 
answered. Linking United States credit to German actions, as 
Messersmith advocated, would not have prevented Germany from continuing 
on the course that it did. It seems as though Messersmith, like many 
other observers who advocated a similar policy of containment, made the 
mistake of expecting that if Germany were treated in a conventional 
manner, she would respond conventionally. This \.;as not the case. 
Messersmith's policy might have temporarily delayed Hitler from moving 
on his expansionist course; but after Hitler managed to procure 
materials, he would have reverted to his same course as before. This 
lesson Messersmith had learned by August 1934 when he wrote Phillips, "I 
think we must realize that irrespective of what [Hitler] -says and of 
what gestures he may make and even some reassuring actions which he may 
take, he will not be in any sense swerved from his original policies and 
intentions."48 
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Early in 1935 Messersmith was encouraged by the possibility of 
containing Hi tIer. The formation of b.'1e Stresa Front -- the united 
stand by Italy, France and Britain against German aggression -- appeared 
to be the beginnings of a sound policy of containment. Coupled with a 
United States denial of credits the Front would be even more successful 
and possibly contribute to a removal of Hi tIer from power. 
This policy did not succeed as the Stresa Front collapsed and 
Germany was able to find trading partners other than the United States 
to get supplies and materials. Messersmith was unable to see German 
economic strength until 1937 at which point it was too late for anyone 
to adopt preventive measures. Messersmith's economic analysis, 
ironically a source of so much of his distrust of Naziism, was incorrect 
throughout this period. However, there was so much about Hitler's 
Germany that Messersmith despised, even without the economic distrust, 
Messersmith still would have come to his same conclusions in other 
areas. Another situation responsible for much of Messersmith's negative 
outlook toward Hitler and Naziism was the Night of Long Knives. 
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The Roehm Purge 
One of the critical events in the early Nazi regime that Messersmith 
was witness to occurred while he was in Vienna. The Roehm Purge, or the 
Night of Long Knives, was one of the most brutal Nazi actions during 
Messersmith's tenure in Europe. His observations from Vienna are 
interesting and, for the most part, insightful. Being away from Germany 
gave him the opportunity to view Hitler's actions at a distance. 
Messersmith's despatches and letters to Washington lend insight, not 
only into the specific situation, but also into his own ideas concerning 
the Nazi regime and Hitler. Before examining Messersmith's analysis of 
the situation, it is necessary to see how history has observed the Night 
• 
of Long Knives. For this purpose I rely on two biographies of Hitler 
one by .Joachim Fest and the other by Alan Bullock, both titled Hitler. 
In 1934, many members of the Nazi Party began calling for further 
reforms in the form of a Second Revolution.. One of the people involved 
was Ernst Roehm, the leader of the Nazi Stormtroops, t.l1e SA. Roehm 
wanted to merge his troups with the standing Army, the Reichswehr. In 
Roehm's eyes, the SA had been largely responsible for helping Hitler 
obtain power and after a year in office Hitler had not improved the 
status of the SA. This was partially true; however, Hitler had yet 
another worry. If he tried to integrate th.e SA with the Reichswehr, he 
would have met with strong opposi tion from the latter group. Hi tIer 
would do nothing to antagonize the tenuous support of the Reichswehr; 
but, something had to be done with the problem between the two groups. 
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During the Spring the problem became tense. Hi tIer learned that the SA 
leadership had decided to pressure him into giving the SA a greater role 
in the Government and in the armed forces. Hermann Goering and 
Goebbels, the other two Nazi leaders, along with Heinrich Himmler, 
leader of the Nazi Secret Police , plotting against Roehm and the SA 
leadership, who they feared might try to undermine their positions 
within the Nazi leadership. They informed Hitler of plots by the SA to 
force Hitler to integrate the SA into the Reichswehr. Hitler decided to 
send the members of the SA on a mandatory one month leave of absence 
scheduled to begin on July 1. The night of June 30, Goering and 
Goebbels informed Hitler of a potential coup planned by Roehm and the 
rest of the SA leadership. How much of Goering and Goebbels r 
information Hitler believed or just found as a convenient alibi for 
conspiring against the SA, i s still debated. It seems as though, if he 
were already alienated from the SA, it would not have taken much to 
convince him to act. That same night, Hitler ordered the arrest of the 
SA leadership; Roehm, Ernst, Heines and other SA leaders were either 
killed or imprisoned. 
Hitler delayed making any public announcements about the Roehm Purge 
until July 13, almost two weeks after the incident. In the speech, 
Hitler gave two reasons for the purge. The first was that Roehm and 
General Kurt von Shcleicher were planning to take over the Government. 
The purge was also necessary according to Hitler, in order to prevent 
the SA from integrating itself wi th the Reichswehr. Hi tIer, in order to 
placate the Army, prevented this from happening, " in the State there is 
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only one bearer of arms, and that is the army; there is only one bearer 
of the political will, and that is the National Socialist Party."49 
Hitler's explanation of the Night of Long Knives is a valuable one 
for the study of history; it does not explain in full what happened the 
night of the Roehm Purge, nor why Hitler acted in the manner that he 
did. It is this issue I now wish to address. 
Removing Roehm and his cadres was certainly an important aspect of 
the purge. Roehm had grown to become a potential rival for Hitler's 
power and there is evidence that Roehm might have begun to use this 
power in the near future. He had discussed the possibility of 
pressuring Hitler into decisions more amenable to his ideas, for 
instance, giving the SA a greater role in Nazi policy-making. 
There was another factor in purging the SA and Roehm. President 
Hindenburg, the leader of the Reichswehr, was very old (He died just 
over a month after the purge). While the Reichswehr never prevented the 
Nazi Government from carrying out its policies, th.ey never overtly 
supported the Hitler Government, either. In addit:ion, Hitler had let 
the SA grow to a size ten times th.at of the Reichswehr. Wi th Hindenburg 
about to die Hitler wanted to make sure the Army's support of the Nazi 
regime did not die, also. Hitler also knew that since March, the head 
of the army, General von Fritsche and Roehm had been feuding over which 
man's organization was the principle armed force in Germany. If Hitler 
were to show the Reichswehr that they were the sole armed force in 
Germany, they might have given Hitler the military support he would need 
in the future. This was exactly what happened when Hindenburg did die 
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on August 2. The Minister of War, Werner von Blomberg , von Fritsche and 
all the Reichswehr leaders pledged their support of the Nazi Regime and 
took a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler as the Head of the German 
State. 
The SA leadership were not the only victims of the Night of Long 
Knives. Many other people were killed at the same time as Roehm --
among b,em, Gregor Strasser, a former Nazi leader, Erich Klausener, head 
of the Catholic Union. Many others were arrested and killed as well. 
It is ironic that Hitler mentioned in his speech the planned removal by 
Roehm of vice-Chancellor, Franz von Papen. Had not Hindenburg directly 
intervened in Hitler's plans, Hitler would have had Papen killed because 
of a speech Papen delivered on June 17, two weeks before the purge which 
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attacked some Nazi principles and Nazi propaganda. The man who wrote 
the speech for Papen, Edgar Jung, as well as another of Papen' s 
secretaries, was killed in the purge. There were some individuals and 
groups who imprOVed their status because of the outcomes of the purge. 
Goering and Goebbelswere able to solidify ·their role in the Party and 
the State. A Nazi organization that benefitted from the purge of the SA 
was the SS, who replaced the SA as the Nazi police force. Himnler, the 
Head of the SS, was responsible for the execution of the purges. How 
responsible Hitler was for sanctioning many of the murders is not known. 
It was certainly an opportunity to clean the Party as well as to get 
political revenge for past grievances. The murder of former General 
State Com~issioner Kahr seems to have no logical reasoning except as 
Hitler's personal revenge because of Kahr ' s role in thwarting Hitler's 
Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. 
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There were also negative consequences of the 
definitive break with Hitler ' s policy of legality. 
purge. It was a 
Each person that was 
killed without trial contributed further to this break. This did not 
have much of an effect on the internal.situation in Germany where the 
public h~d become submissive. However, reports of the purge and its 
brutality were read outside of Germany where the outrage was great~ For 
the first time Hitler had tipped his hand to the world and the\vorld 
respo·nded with shock. '!'he London Times presented an editorial deploring 
the methods which Hitler used to carry out his purge, and Messersmith 
recommended strongly that the State Department read it. 
Messersmi th was not in Germany at the time of the Night of Long 
Knives. He had begun his job in Vienna less than two months earlier, 
but his memories of Germany and its leaders were still very fresh in his 
mind. On July ~, three days after the purge, Messersmith wrote a 
despatch to the Department describing Austria' s reaction to the purge. 
TWo days later he wrote Phillips an eight-page personal and confidential 
letter giving his own, "reaction and interpretation"50. This is the 
most extensive document Messersmith wrote on the Night of Long Knives. 
Messersmith began his letter by discounting 
that he thwarted a plot by Roehm and Schleicher. 
Hitler' s explanation 
Instead he wrote that, 
lithe weight of the facts available is on the side that it was a coup by 
Hi tIer, Goring and Goebbels to save the Party . and their own 
situation".51. Later in the same paragraph he defined the word "coup" a 
second way -- an overthrow of the State by a group out of power. Simply 
because Hitler held the office of Chancellor did not necessarily mean he 
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was in power. In fact, Messersmith asserted that the opposite was the 
case, 
it is quite clear and has been for some time , as I have 
pointed out in my letters, that the power had passed from 
Hitler and the primary leaders, if they ever had it, to 
the secondary leaders, who for the most part are in or 
with the S.A. It has been clear for several months that 
the dissensions in th.e Party were serious and approaching 
a point where they might be disasterous.52 
Within the last four months Hitler had seen his power slip and knew that 
if he did not do something to secure his power he would be lost. 
Messersmith continued, pointing out that Hitler was willing to use, as 
he showed this night, any means possible in order to gain his ends - no 
matter how brutal. 
Messersmith then began to speculate why certain people were 
murdered. In his thinking about the matter it seems as though he placed 
too great an emphasis on a cause-effect relationship. 
For instance, Messersmith considered the murder of Schleicher to be an 
incident which was designed both to prevent action by the Reichswehr and 
intimidate its officers. The role of the army will be discussed later; 
but, Schleicher ' s murder seems to have been much more related to a 
personal vendetta which Hitler developed because of the role Shleicher 
played in keeping Hitler out of office in 1932. Messersmith compared 
these killings to "Mafia-type" intimdation. liThe execution of Gregor 
Strasser was apparantly intended to intimidate the intellectuals and 
middle class."S3 But Messersmith was one step short in his analysis. 
Hitler ordered Strasser's execution not only because of his personal 
hatred for Strasser but also, because he saw in Strasser a potential 
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leader of middle class and intellectual resistance. By killing 
Strasser, Hitler prevented a potential source of opposition from 
emerging. In this respect, Strasser's murder could be compared to 
Roehm's. By killing the leadership (or in Strasser's case, potential 
leadership) of potential resisters, Hitler rendered this group impotent, 
and prevented them from creating -serious political damage. 
Messersmi 1:..11 next outlined the roles Goering and Goebbelsplayed in 
the purges. He considered . it strange that both. men should support 
Hitler together given that they disliked one another so intensely. It 
is even stranger that Goebbeis took a stand against the SA. Until 
recently before the SA purge, Goebbels had been in support of the 
generally more radical policies of the SA and Strasser. Such a switch 
on Goebbels' part did not surprise Messersmi th. "Goebbels is 
intelligent and he knew that they [the SA] were rapidly going on the 
rocks, so that the only way to save his position was to side with 
Hitler. n S4 Like Goebbels who believed joining Hitler was his only chance 
to maintain his role in the government, Goering, who Messersmith 
considered to be the most responsible of the three leaders, also sided 
with Hitler. Since Goering represented the reasonable side of the Party 
(as opposed to Goebbels who represented the ruthless side), Messersmith 
felt Goering would stay in the government if the Reichswehr ushered in a 
new Conservative Government. 
Messersmith did not realize that th.e army, had no political 
aspirations. The Army's main aim was to make sure that their role as 
the only military force in Germany was secure. Hitler satisfied these 
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aspirations on June 30 when he eliminated the SA, reaffirming, his 
speech to the Reichstag, the Army's 
hoped that the Riechswehr would 
preeminent position. I'1essersmi th 
see in the Night of Long Knives the 
brutality of the Nazi regime. He hoped this would compel them to move 
against Hitler. Unfortunately for Messersmith, the Reichswehr was the 
sole non-Nazi beneficiary of tl1e purge, and because of this, they 
willing to to turn a blind eye to the Party's brutality. 
Three months before the Roehm purge, Messersmith observed the 
growing hostility between Roehm and von Fritsche over the role of the SA 
and of th.e Reichswehr. Messersmith wrote, liThe final descision in this 
quarrel will rest with Hi tIer, and I am inclined to think that Hi tIer 
will not let Roehm' s plans go through. The Chancellor himself is not 
prepared to let the Reichswehr disappear for he may have to use it 
himself ••• "55 Nine months before this letter Messersmith wrote a 
despatch outlining information he had received which involved Hitler' s 
purging of the Party, the SA and other radical views. He felt such 
action would be, "decidedly more optimistic. and encouraging than it has 
been at any time since March 5."56 It is clear Messersmit.l-J. had 
considered even encouraged - th.e idea of a purge. Why then was he 
so horrified when the actual event took place? More importantly, why 
did he th.ink that the Reichswehr, who he admi tted had li ttle or no 
political aspirations, would try to take power after the purge? 
Messersmith's horror and shock was not derived from Hitler's 
intentions, but rather from his meth.ods. It was one thing for the 
Fuhrer to suggest a purge of the Party ranks and another for him, 
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Goering, Goebbels and the SS to murder Roehm and other former leaders, 
Nazi and non-Nazi. 
One of the things that astounded Messersmith was how much Germany 
was unaffected by ~~e purge. The country seemed to react as though 
nothing out of the ordinary had happened. Another reason for 
-
Messersmith's horror was the rut.hless tactics used. by .Hit.ler and the 
others. The terror was, in Messersmith's mind, excessive and 
unnecessary. Not even Messersmith would have considered Hitler capable 
of carrying out such a bloody scheme. 
On July 11, 1934 Messersmith wrote Moffat that the Army's job would 
be to usher in a new government, insisting that such change was 
inevitable. With all the disadvantages Hitler suffered from .the purge, 
the one definite victory he accrued was the accumulation of the Army's 
support -- the CUlmination of which was in the personal oath of loyalty 
to Hitler that all the officers took later that surrroer as a result of 
Hindenburg I S death. 'rhere is Ii ttle doubt that if Hi tIer had not given 
the assurances he did to the Army in the Roehm purge, the Reicbswehr 
would not have given Hitler a personal oath of loyalty. 
Messersmith never really explained why he said the Army would move 
against Hitler after the purge. He mentioned the randomness of the 
killing as a factor; but, this did not upset the Reichswehr because they 
were given what they wanted. Instead, it seems as though Messersmith 
saw in the Arlny the last possible hope for a change in government. The 
people had been terrified to the point of total docility, and the only 
way Messersmith's hope of ousting Hitler and the Nazis from power was 
38 
wi th the Reichswehr. This was possibly the greatest error in judgement 
Messersmith could have made. By that point his wishes were impeding his 
analysis. This mistake was a common one among diplomats who dealt with 
the Nazis in the 1930's. Chamberlain, Dodd, Francois-Poncet and others 
allowed their feelings and hopes to infringe upon their analyses of the 
situation. Messersmith was not alone in assuming that the Blood Purge 
would bring the Government down. Throughout Europe, foreign statesmen 
felt that Hitler would soon be replaced. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister; Benes in Czechoslovakia; and persons at the Quai d'Orsay in 
France all predicted tL,at Hi tIer would soon become a figurehead for the 
Reichswehr.S7 
The rest of Messersmith ' s analysis of the purge was less skewed than 
as his prediction of a Reichswehr revolution. For l'1essersmith, the 
actual occurance of the purge was a minor victory for his analysis. For 
months he warned Washington of Nazi brutality. Though Messersmith never 
expected anything on the scale of the Roehm purge, Hi tIer I sactions gave 
substance to i'1essersmi th I S warnings. The policy Messersmi th had 
advocated in relation to Nazi brutality was for the United States to 
remain economically distant. 
complete aloofness, for it 
"I hope we will maintain our arri tude of 
is the best possible way we have to help 
Germany and the rest of the world and ourselves."S8 
Me~sersmith left the Night of Long Knives feeling very pessimistic 
about the future. He first made the point that the Nazi housecleaning 
was only partial; and, as long as Goebbels and others remained, 
dangerous elements within the Party still existed. Secondly, 
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Messersmith claimed that Hitler, by sanctioning the mass killings , had 
lowered himself to the same barbarous level as the people that were 
killed. To fight barbarity with barbarity only exposed the ruthless 
character of Hitler, Goring, Goebbels and Himmler. 
'!be most important aspect of the purge for Messersmith \'las not its 
short-term effect, but rather its future impact. Messersmitll sadly 
noted in his letter to Phillips that nothing had changed. Two weeks 
later, in a letter to Moffat he wrote, "since the 30th of June there has 
been no indication whatever of a change in policy in the social or 
economic field. No matter how much the Triurnverate may wish to change 
its policy, it is just as incapable of doing it today with any success 
as before the 30th."59 When Messersmith came away from the purge 
realizing that all to be seen in the future was more of the same, he was 
correct. Little did he know what such a future would hold. 
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Conclusions 
Messersmith remained in Vienna for two more years at which time he 
was called back to Washington to serve as Assistant Secretary of State. 
During the remainder of his stay in Europe he continued to warn of the 
Nazi threat and potential danger. His talents . as an observer and 
reporter of Nazi affairs were unparalelled anywhere in the State 
Department. 
His failure to see German economic growth under Hitler was 
undeniable. His decision not to press for an easing of immigration laws 
to allow more Jews the opportunity to emigrate to the United States 
while he was aware of what the Nazis were doing, was unexcusable. 
Letting his feelil1gs and his wishes impede his analysis was 
unprofessional. In these shortcomings, Messersmith was not alone. Many 
other high placed European leaders and diplomats miscalculated Nazi 
intentions to the same erroneous extent as Messersmith. 
The State Department during this 
Messersmith, was nearly inept in 
period, with the 
its dealings wi th 
exeption of 
the German 
Government. The American Ambassador in Berlin, William I:bdd, was also a 
severe critic of Nazi Germany. He was so cynical of the Hitler regime, 
however, that he ended all contact he had with the Government and tried 
to do his job with as little involvement with the German Government as 
possible. Dodd's reporting suffered because of this tactic. 
Messersmith, while he never had an active relationship with the German 
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Government , kept in close contact with persons from whom he could 
receive information. Other diplomats , like Alfred Kliefoth, had poor 
analysis. Even the people in a position to formulate policy were 
ineffectual. Robert Divine's book, The Reluctant Belligerant, and 
Offner's American Appeasement outline the ineffectiveness of Roosevelt's 
foreign policy toward Germany through the outbreak of war. While 
Messersmi th was not the most perceptive diplomat ever, his. insights 
concerning Germany were far more enlightened and professional than any 
of his peers and superiors. Even in his incorrect economic analysis, he 
cited many other people's analyses to substantiate his claim. If he was 
not always correct, he was usually professional. 
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